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ABSTRACT. Widespread flooding in June 2013 caused damage costs of €6 to 8 billion in Germany, and awoke many memories of the
floods in August 2002, which resulted in total damage of €11.6 billion and hence was the most expensive natural hazard event in
Germany up to now. The event of 2002 does, however, also mark a reorientation toward an integrated flood risk management system
in Germany. Therefore, the flood of 2013 offered the opportunity to review how the measures that politics, administration, and civil
society have implemented since 2002 helped to cope with the flood and what still needs to be done to achieve effective and more
integrated flood risk management. The review highlights considerable improvements on many levels, in particular (1) an increased
consideration of flood hazards in spatial planning and urban development, (2) comprehensive property-level mitigation and
preparedness measures, (3) more effective flood warnings and improved coordination of disaster response, and (4) a more targeted
maintenance of flood defense systems. In 2013, this led to more effective flood management and to a reduction of damage. Nevertheless,
important aspects remain unclear and need to be clarified. This particularly holds for balanced and coordinated strategies for reducing
and overcoming the impacts of flooding in large catchments, cross-border and interdisciplinary cooperation, the role of the general
public in the different phases of flood risk management, as well as a transparent risk transfer system. Recurring flood events reveal
that flood risk management is a continuous task. Hence, risk drivers, such as climate change, land-use changes, economic developments,
or demographic change and the resultant risks must be investigated at regular intervals, and risk reduction strategies and processes
must be reassessed as well as adapted and implemented in a dialogue with all stakeholders.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2013, widespread flooding occurred in many Central
European countries, i.e., in Switzerland, Austria, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, and
particularly in Germany, where, in hydrological terms, this flood
can be regarded as the most severe event over at least the last 60
years (Merz et al. 2014). The event awoke many memories of
flooding in August 2002, when record breaking rainfall amounts
resulted in extreme discharges and water levels in the rivers Elbe
and Danube and some of their tributaries (see Ulbrich et al. 2003,
Engel 2004). Back then, the high hydraulic impact led to the
activation of dam spillways as well as to overtopping and
breaching of embankments in many places. Among other aspects,
missing or incomplete flood warnings, bad maintenance of flood
protection structures, as well as a lack of risk awareness and
knowledge about adequate response were identified as
weaknesses of the flood risk management (DKKV 2003, Thieken
et al. 2005a). In Germany, 21 people were killed and the total
damage amounted to €11.6 billion (reference year 2005, Thieken
et al. 2006). This amount exceeded losses of former disastrous
events by far and has not been surpassed by the 2013 flood for
which overall direct losses of €6 to 8 billion are assumed (Thieken
et al. 2016).  
After the floods in 1993 and 1995 along the Rhine River, a more
integrated flood risk management had already been proposed by
the German Working Group on Water Issues of the Federal States
and the Federal Government (LAWA). However, these guidelines
(LAWA 1995) were not sufficiently reflected in the German water
legislation. After the flood in 2002, many activities were launched
on administrative and legislative levels (e.g., DKKV 2003, Heintz
et al. 2012, Bubeck et al. 2015). Particularly, the German Flood
Protection Act of 2005 (Artikelgesetz zur Verbesserung des
vorbeugenden Hochwasserschutzes) and the European Floods
Directive (2007/60/EC; EC 2007) introduced important changes
in the German Federal Water Act (Wasserhaushaltsgesetz). This
marked a further shift from a purely technically oriented flood
defense toward a more integrated flood risk management system
that also considers nonstructural measures to minimize adverse
effects of flooding (Hartmann and Albrecht 2014).  
Smaller flood events in 2005, 2006, 2010, and 2011 already
revealed that regional and local governments as well as flood-
prone residents and companies had adapted to the flood risk and
had implemented precautionary and preparatory measures
(Kreibich et al. 2011a, Kienzler et al. 2015a). Because such high-
frequency-low-impact-events are usually easier to cope with than
extreme floods, the severe and widespread summer flood in 2013
offered the opportunity to evaluate how effective the measures
were that politics, administration, and civil society had
implemented since 2002. Therefore, the main research questions
of this paper are the following:  
. What changes have been made in the German flood risk
management system since the flood of August 2002?
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. Did these changes help to avoid and mitigate damage due
to flooding in June 2013? 
. What should be further done to achieve a more integrated
flood risk management system in Germany? 
To tackle these questions a review of the flood risk management
system in Germany was undertaken from October 2013 to
February 2015 and fully published by DKKV (2015). In this
paper, the main findings are summarized.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
For an analysis of how a society reacts and adapts to damaging
events, the risk management cycle offers a valuable framework
(e.g., DKKV 2003, Kienholz et al. 2004). In our review, three
phases were considered:  
. (emergency) response: during the event, immediate
measures are undertaken with the priority to limit adverse
effects and the duration of the event; 
. recovery: after the event, the affected society starts to repair
damage and to regain the same or a similar standard of
living as before the damaging event happened; 
. risk reduction: in this period, measures are planned and
implemented that aim at minimizing risks. 
Three main risk reduction strategies were distinguished: (1) flood
control to avoid inundation of (urban) areas, (2) loss prevention
by adapted use of flood-prone areas, and (3) preparedness for
response and recovery. For the evaluation, each strategy was
further divided into particular measures, which were reviewed in
detail. Owing to the large spectrum of topics, a variety of
approaches and methods was needed to collect and analyze
appropriate data and information. For example, flood-related
parliamentarian inquiries, policy documents and laws, publicly
accessible flood hazard and risk maps, event documentations,
and (media) reports were systematically searched to capture
developments in flood risk management, particularly on the level
of all 16 federal states in Germany (Länder) which are mainly in
charge of flood risk management. This material was
accompanied by written surveys among property insurers in
Germany as well as among the supreme water authorities of all
16 federal states. The latter was followed by a stakeholder
workshop in June 2014 to derive recommendations. Emergency
response was evaluated on the basis of (internal) reports of relief
and aid organizations on the flood of 2013. In addition,
representatives of different relief  and aid organizations were
interviewed using a semistructured format and common
recommendations were discussed at a workshop in November
2014 (DKKV 2015). Furthermore, the role of flood-prone
residents as well as businesses was investigated by computer-
aided telephone interviews (CATI) of 1652 private households
and 557 companies. Both questionnaires were comparable to
surveys conducted after the flood in 2002 (see Thieken et al.
2005b for the household survey and Kreibich et al. 2007 for the
business survey). Finally, hydraulic and damage simulations were
undertaken in two case studies to explore the interaction between
public and private mitigation measures (see Kienzler et al.
2015b).
THE FLOOD OF JUNE 2013 IN COMPARISON WITH
AUGUST 2002
Meteorological conditions
In Central Europe, abundant and widespread flood-producing
rainfall is usually coupled to certain large-scale weather patterns
(Bárdossy and Filiz 2005, Petrow et al. 2009) that also occurred
in 2002 and 2013. In most cases an upper level trough, which is
an elongated area of relatively low atmospheric pressure at about
5500 m asl, extends with its axis roughly from Denmark
southward across Germany toward the central Mediterranean
Sea. The northerly to northeasterly flow at lower levels of the
troposphere causes the largest amounts of precipitation along the
windward slopes of the west-east-oriented mountain ranges in
Central Europe, e.g., the Ore Mountains (Erzgebirge) or the Alps.  
In 2002, the largest rainfall amounts were observed in eastern
Germany and exceeded 100 mm within 72 hours at many places,
such as in large parts of Brandenburg and in most of Saxony. In
the latter, a record breaking total of 312 mm within 24 hours was
observed at the Zinnwald-Georgenfeld rain gauge in the Ore
Mountains (Ulbrich et al. 2003). Similar amounts were also
recorded in the Bavarian and Bohemian forests as well as in the
foothills of the Alps (Fig. 1, bottom left panel).  
In June 2013, an isolated upper-level low pressure system centered
over Central Europe triggered the development of several surface
low pressure systems that circled around the upper level low on
similar tracks. This configuration resulted in a steady and
significant transport of moist and warm air masses toward
Central Europe. The Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea served
as sources of moisture, but evaporation from continental
landmasses of southeastern Europe also played an important role
(Grams et al. 2014).  
The most intense rainfall occurred in the Danube catchment in
the alpine areas of southern Bavaria and northern Austria. The
German Weather Service’s rain gauge of Aschau-Stein in the
Chiemgau Alps reported a rainfall total of 346 mm within 72
hours (Schröter et al. 2015). Rainfall totals in excess of 100 mm
also occurred in the Ore Mountains, along the Swabian Alb and
in the northern Black Forest (Schröter et al. 2015; Fig. 1, bottom
right panel). However, over a 24-hour period, Aschau-Stein
received 170.5 mm, which is far below the rainfall recorded in
2002.
Hydrological processes and hydraulic impacts
The floods in August 2002 and June 2013 were extreme events
with regard to magnitude and spatial extent. A distinctive feature
of the August 2002 flood was the extremely intense precipitation
in the Ore Mountains (see above; Fig. 1 bottom left panel), which
resulted in flash floods, e.g., on the rivers Mulde, Weißeritz, and
Schwarze Elster. Discharge return periods were estimated to be
150-200 years at the Dresden gauge, 200-300 years at the Mulde
River, and 100-300 years at the Regen River (Ulbrich et al. 2003,
IKSE 2004; Fig 1, bottom left panel). In comparison, the flood
in June 2013 was mainly driven by the combination of high
catchment wetness due to a strong rainfall anomaly during the
month of May (Fig. 1, top right panel) and spatially extended
high but not extraordinary precipitation (Merz et al. 2014,
Schröter et al. 2015; Fig. 1, bottom right panel). At the onset of
the June 2013 flood, the hydraulic load of large parts of the river
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Fig. 1. Hydro-meteorological characteristics of the August 2002 (left) and the June 2013 flood (right). Top panel:
Initial wetness in terms of the antecedent precipitation index (API) and hydraulic load as the ratio of the
streamflow at the event start (Qi) and the mean annual flood discharge (MHQ); bottom panel: event
precipitation in terms of the maximum precipitation total within 3 days (Pmax 3-days) and the return period of
peak discharges (Tn-Qp).
network in Germany was already increased and thus the
conveyance capacity of river sections had already been strained
(see Fig. 1, upper right panel, for a quantification of the initial
hydraulic load in terms of the ratio of mean daily discharge at
event start and the mean of annual maximum discharges; Schröter
et al. 2015). The pattern of increased initial hydraulic load reflects
the spatial distribution of high initial catchment wetness (Fig. 1,
upper right panel) and applies mostly to the central and
southeastern part of Germany. In comparison, for the August
2002 flood the initial hydraulic load of the river network was
clearly lower except for some alpine tributaries of the Danube
(Fig. 1, top left panel).  
In August 2002, flooding occurred particularly along the river
Elbe in the city of Dresden and downstream to the confluence of
the river Mulde, along the Elbe tributaries in the Ore Mountains
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as well as the Regen River, a left-bank tributary of the Danube
(Ulbrich et al. 2003, IKSE 2004). The flood in June 2013 was
characterized by the slow development of an elongated flood wave
carrying huge volumes of water with unusual simultaneous
discharge contributions from the Elbe, Mulde, and Saale
catchments (Conradt et al. 2013). Large-scale flooding affected
almost all main river basins in Germany (Merz et al. 2014,
Schröter et al. 2015). Severe flooding occurred along the rivers
Danube, Elbe, and its tributaries Saale and Mulde. In Passau, the
highest water level since 1501 was observed, because of the
superposition of the flood waves from the rivers Inn and Danube
(Blöschl et al. 2013, BfG 2014). Because of the large spatial extent
of flood peaks with high magnitudes (Fig. 1, bottom right panel),
the June 2013 flood was from a hydrological perspective the most
severe flood in Germany at least for the last six decades (Schröter
et al. 2015).
Socioeconomic impacts
With a total amount of €11.6 billion direct losses (reference year
2005; Thieken et al. 2006), the flood event of August 2002 has
been the most expensive natural hazard event in Germany up to
now. Eight of the 16 states reported losses. In addition, federal
infrastructure was heavily affected; this involved federal assets
like railways, motorways, navigable waterways, and administrative
buildings. Saxony was by far the worst hit federal state—75% of
the overall losses originated here, followed by Saxony-Anhalt
(10%) and the Federal Government (8%).  
In 2013, 12 federal states announced losses and in parts of 8 a
state of emergency was declared (BMI 2013). Even though the
loss estimation of the June 2013 flood is still preliminary, the total
direct losses will possibly not reach the sum of €8 billion that was
reported to the European Solidarity Fund in July 2013 (Thieken
et al. 2016). By July 2015, the overall losses were estimated to
around €6 billion (Thieken et al. 2016). Again Saxony was the
worst affected state with approximately 37% of the overall losses,
followed by Saxony-Anhalt (28%), Bavaria (21%), Thuringia
(7%), and the Federal Government (2%; data sources: DKKV
2015, Federal Parliament 2015).  
From the overall losses, the insurance industry paid €1.8 billion
in 2002 and €1.65 billion in 2013 (GDV 2015) even though the
flood insurance penetration rose from 19% in 2002 to 34% in 2013
(GDV 2014). Hence, not only overall losses dropped, but also the
insured losses of the June 2013 flood were lower than in 2002.
FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT CHANGES IN GERMANY
SINCE 2002
The flood risk management in Germany was reviewed for three
domains of flood risk management:  
. retention of flood water and protection measures (flood
control) to avoid inundation of (urban) areas, 
. loss prevention by adapted use of flood-prone areas
(including flood-adapted design and use of buildings and
property-level mitigation measures), and 
. preparedness for response and recovery (e.g., by risk transfer
mechanisms). 
Each section starts with the situation in 2002 according to DKKV
(2003), highlights developments since 2002 as well as the
performance during the 2013 flood event, and ends with some
recommendations for the upcoming years.
Flood control
Decentralized flood control measures
“Every cubic meter of water that is retained through reclamation
of floodplains, renaturation of surface water bodies, unsealing of
land, seepage and site-appropriate agriculture and forestry, as well
as through the preservation and promotion of small landscape
structures for water retention, is a benefit for the ecosystem and
relieves us in the case of flooding” (LAWA 1995:20; our
translation). However, the effectiveness of measures for
enhancing natural water retention, often referred to as
decentralized flood control measures, to reduce extreme flood
situations as of 2002 has often been overestimated. Hence, DKKV
(2003) recommended developing benchmarks for the effectiveness
of such measures with regard to different catchment sizes and
flood intensities.  
By 2013, studies on the assessment of the effectiveness of
decentralized measures were published by the German
Association for Water, Wastewater and Waste (DWA 2006), which
highlight that such measures can be very effective in small
catchments in the case of frequent floods and can moreover have
positive effects for the surface water body ecologies, erosion
control, and the restoration of the natural water balance. During
the flood of 2013 it was further observed, e.g., in Dresden, that
restored surface water bodies of the secondary category did not
incur any flood damage. The flood event however revealed again
that the discharge capacity especially at bridges and culverts must
be always maintained to prevent backwater effects and hence
minimize damage in the case of extreme events.  
In addition, flood origination areas, i.e., areas with a high
incidence of rainfall and quick runoff generation, have been
mapped in Saxony. Statutory rules that aim to prevent surface
sealing in these areas are part of the Saxon Water Act (SächsWG
§76 as of 2015).  
In general, decentralized flood control measures were not
discussed after the 2013 event as intensively as in 2002. Instead,
large-scale retention measures such as flood polders gained
importance in the national flood protection program. With regard
to European water policies, measures to improve natural water
retention are an important field of action with potentially
conflicting priorities between the European Water Framework
Directive (2000/60/EC, EC 2000) and the European Floods
Directive (2007/60/EC, EC 2007). The effects of measures on
surface water bodies and in the catchment areas must therefore
be identified for both directives with the goal to achieve or
strengthen synergies. Furthermore, federal states should check
whether it would be possible to implement the approach taken by
Saxony to preserve infiltration capacities of areas in which surface
runoff is quickly generated.
Flood control by polders and restoration of floodplains
Especially in the case of extreme floods, controlled retention
basins (polders) are indispensable to cap flood peaks, as the
activation of the Havel polder in Brandenburg demonstrated
during the flood in August 2002 (Förster et al. 2005). Therefore,
increased efforts to designate retention areas that can be flooded
in a controlled and hence effective manner were requested in the
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aftermath of the 2002 flood (e.g., DKKV 2003). In addition, it
was recognized that floodplains had been reduced to one third of
their original extent in Germany and to 10 to 20% along large
rivers and should thus be reactivated; where possible,
embankments should be relocated to create more retention areas
along the rivers (BfN 2009).  
Also in 2013, controlled flood retention basins and dams have
contributed to a marked capping of flood peaks in all affected
river catchments (BfG 2014). However, retention capacities are
still limited. Dike relocations and new polder areas have only been
created occasionally. For example, the reactivation of 420 ha
floodplain at Lenzen on the river Elbe is currently the biggest
realized project in Germany and reduced flood water levels in
2013 (Promny et al. 2014). To further strengthen this flood
management strategy, the Federal Environment Ministry set up
a National Flood Protection Program together with the LAWA
to identify potential areas for reactivation of floodplains, dike
relocations, and new polder areas that are of national relevance.
All projects shown in Figure 2 were assessed with several criteria,
e.g., potential risk reduction, synergies with the water framework
directive, costs etc. The program was agreed in October 2014,
although the financing mechanism between the federal
government and the federal states required further negotiations
(DKKV 2015). Finally, it was agreed that the removal of weak
points of flood protection schemes should be solely financed by
the federal state in charge. Still, the implementation of the projects
will take several years to decades.
Fig. 2. Projects of the National Flood Protection Program as of
July 2014.
Flood defense by embankments
To protect areas from being inundated, in particular urban areas
with high damage potential but also arable land, technical
measures such as embankments have a long tradition (Bubeck et
al. 2015) and have thus been in place along many rivers. However,
technical measures provide safety only if  they are well maintained
and design levels are not surpassed. In 2002, however, overtopping
and breaches of embankments were an important flood pathway.
In total, 131 dikes failed in Saxony: 16 along the river Elbe and
115 in the Mulde catchment (DKKV 2003). DKKV (2003)
verified that dams were in good condition before the 2002 flood,
but embankments, especially along the Elbe and Mulde rivers,
showed deficiencies. This was predominantly ascribed to unclear
and disjointed responsibilities between the federal, the state, and
the municipal level as well as to the high costs of maintenance.
To prevent malfunctions, flood defense systems should thus be
continuously monitored and maintained. Aside from having the
issue of responsibility clarified, DKKV (2003) advised discussing
societal-accepted safety levels. Moreover, the residual risk behind
protective structures should be quantified and communicated.  
With the introduction of the German industrial standard DIN
19700 in July 2004, the assessment of the risks of dam failures
was brought up to date: spillways have to be designed for a 1000-
year flood discharge and the safety of the construction has to be
proven for a 10,000-year flood discharge. Furthermore, extensive
renewal and upgrading of embankments have been undertaken
since 2002 so that considerably fewer breaches occurred in 2013.
The systems strengthened since 2002 were able to withstand the
hydraulic load in 2013 (LAWA 2014): only five breaches occurred
in the Saxon part of the river Elbe and 24 failures along the river
Mulde. Still, particularly three breaches, namely near Deggendorf
at the Danube River, near Groß Rosenburg at the Saale River and
near Fischbeck at the Elbe River had dramatic dimensions (Merz
et al. 2014). These breaches demonstrated that leaking oil tanks
can cause considerable material and environmental damage,
which could be easily avoided by appropriate and comparatively
inexpensive precautionary measures such as securing of oil tanks
at household level (see Kreibich et al. 2011b). Altogether, the flood
in June 2013 confirmed again that technical measures effectively
protect (urban) areas up to the design event.  
The levee breaches during the 2013 flood also suggest that the
communication of the protection level of structures still has to
be improved and that residents behind embankments have to
develop precautionary and preparatory strategies. However,
many more hazard maps, also showing potential flooding behind
embankments, were accessible in 2013 because the effects of
extreme events beyond the 100-year flood, which often serves as
design event of a defense system, have to be investigated for the
hazard maps according to the European Floods Directive. As a
result, the level of private precaution behind embankments was
already better in 2013 than in 2002 (DKKV 2015). This indicates
that residents already acknowledge that embankments do not
provide 100% protection. Still, potential failure scenarios must
be presented more transparently and consistently, and a greater
nuance of management strategies must be put up for discussion.
For example, encircling and bulkhead dikes, as well as secondary
lines of defense are being planned in Bavaria. Moreover, the flood-
safe storage of heating oil tanks should be better monitored by
the authorities in charge. The securing of oil tanks or a transition
from oil to other forms of energy such as natural gas is worth
encouraging in areas that will be inundated if  flood defenses fail.
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Controversies on flood control measures
DKKV (2003) stressed that neither retention measures nor
protection measures are a universal remedy, but should be
incorporated into integrated, locally adapted concepts. The fact
that flood protection schemes were strengthened after 2002 and
less dike breaches occurred partially triggered a discussion
whether activities in upstream areas aggravated the flood situation
downstream. Furthermore, increasing flood water levels from
2002 in 2013 in certain reaches of the River Elbe hint to the
problem that considerable aggradation had taken place in the
dikes’ forelands, which reduced the flood protection level. In some
areas there has already been a reaction: for example, through the
River Danube Foreland Management the flood water levels of
the river Danube could be lowered. In other areas, solutions that
coincide with nature conservation are being sought.  
The public debate related to the flood in June 2013 also revealed
that the planning and implementation of flood defense schemes
form grounds for many disputes between authorities and the
general public (Otto et al. 2016). On the one hand, protective
measures are requested by parts of the affected population and
enjoy strong acceptance in satisfying desires for safety. On the
other hand they are rejected because of the side effects they have
on the landscape and on nature, or because of particular usage
interests (Otto et al. 2016). Mobile systems often serve as a
compromise solution for the protection of urban areas, but in the
case of an event these require deployment forces that are then no
longer available for other tasks. To avoid disputes, the concerns
and experiences of flood-prone residents and companies should
be heard and entered into planning processes. Hence, early
involvement, before the formal public hearings of the planning
approval, is recommended (see Otto et al. 2016).  
A more positive and creative attitude to the German multilevel
governance system would be desirable. The subsidiary principle
is advantageous for addressing regional specifics, but has its limits
when the interests of others are affected. Transboundary issues
must therefore be identified systematically to agree upon common
strategic goals and find solutions. The drafts of the flood risk
management plans as of 2014 reveal, however, that transnational
coordination and prioritization measures, e.g., through cost-
benefit or multicriteria analyses, are seldom considered (DKKV
2015). Downstream effects of measures and transboundary issues
are rarely addressed, but must not be neglected from a catchment-
wide perspective. It is advisable that flood risk management plans
include arrangements on how to exchange plans, knowledge, and
information within the whole catchment, how to assess measures,
and how to compensate for adverse effects of measures. In
Germany, it would be worth considering a moderating role of the
federal government.  
The modeling study by Kienzler et al. (2015b) along the river
Mulde suggests that a scenario with improved property-level
mitigation and preparedness should be investigated and discussed
as a reference management scenario. In areas that have not
received flood protection because of regional prioritization
procedures, alternatives must be developed, e.g., in the form of a
systematic advancement of property-level mitigation and
preparedness (Kreibich et al. 2015). Such alternatives should be
communicated and financially supported by the government.
Adapted use of flood-prone areas
Reducing damage potential by flood-adapted land-use planning
Decisive to reduce flood damage is the prevention of urban
development and infrastructure in flood-prone areas. The 2002
flood revealed that spatial planning as an effective tool for loss
prevention played a negligible role (Petrow et al. 2006). Hence,
DKKV (2003) recommended that the legal rules for governing
development in flood-prone areas must be formulated clearly and
unambiguously. If  not only a stagnation in damage potential, but
also a real reduction is aimed at, financial means and incentives for
reconstruction at another location (retreat or relocation) have to
be discussed as well (DKKV 2003).  
In Germany, flood-adapted spatial planning has received a
considerable boost through the European Floods Directive
(2007/60/EC) as well as through changes in the Federal Water Act
in 2005 and 2009. By the end of 2013, flood hazard and risk maps
were available in all German states and publicly accessible on the
internet. However, maps are not necessarily tailored to the
information needs and skills of the residents at risk (Meyer et al.
2012). Even so, there are still exceptions when it comes to the
designation of new building areas and the densification of existing
built-up areas, even in declared statutory flood plains. In addition,
there are no restrictions for areas behind flood defenses. Only in
Saxony has a grading system with regard to building conditions for
flood-safe planning, construction, and rehabilitation been
introduced after the 2013 flood (DKKV 2015).  
Retreat with reconstruction of damaged buildings at another
location has only been performed in isolated cases since 2002, e.g.,
in Röderau-Süd, near Dresden (Müller 2010), which among other
things could be ascribed to the high costs, which will as a rule only
be taken on partly by insurances or public authorities (DKKV
2015). In future, the role of relocation in flood risk management
should be clarified. Legal provisions and financial concepts should
subsequently be updated.  
In urban planning, provision must also be made to inhibit further
development and densification in statutory flood plains and
existing flood-prone built-up areas. This must be safeguarded
legally, so that exemption clauses can be kept to a minimum. In
flood-prone areas, an entry of the flood hazard level into the land
register is advisable so that adapted planning and construction is
enforced at the outset.
Strengthening of responsibility and contributions of property
owners
Before the 2002 flood, contributions of property owners to flood
risk reduction, which includes preparedness for response, property-
level mitigation measures, and flood insurance, had been
inadequately developed. It was not sufficiently clear to people
whether they live in a flood-prone area, how to protect themselves,
and whether precautionary measures pay off  (Kreibich et al. 2005).
Helpful local information material was lacking. There were no tax
incentives, nor were property-level mitigation measures rewarded
by insurance companies (Thieken et al. 2006).  
In 2005, the obligation to implement property-level mitigation
measures was introduced in the Federal Water Act (WHG § 5 as of
2009); however, the implementation thereof remains unclear. State-
run promotional programs are lacking, though insurance
companies reward building precautionary measures more strongly
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today than in 2002 (DKKV 2015). In general, contributions of
property owners were clearly more pronounced in 2013 than in
2002 (Fig. 3). In many communities, municipality-specific
information material has been made publicly available. However,
a stronger need for information still exists, especially in areas that
are rarely affected by floods or that are located behind flood
defense systems.
Fig. 3. Property-level mitigation measures performed by flood-
affected residents before and after the flood in 2002 or 2013
and measures planned for the next six months. Note that some
measures (marked in the figure with 1) can only be
implemented by homeowners; hence tenants were not asked
about their implementation.
Because flood defense systems and disaster response can fail,
precautionary self-provision must be further stimulated and
honored, especially in the commercial sector and in areas that are
not (well) protected (Kreibich et al. 2011a). For this purpose, the
establishment of a funding and support program of the German
Credit Institute for Reconstruction (KfW) should be considered.
To systematically improve property-level flood risk reduction, the
recently developed “flood passport” (Hochwasserpass) that
supports a systematic object-specific risk assessment and
reduction can be a helpful tool and should be better appreciated
as a suitable adaptation measure to flood risk by banks and
insurance companies in negotiations about mortgage or flood
insurance coverage. This passport should also be tailored to the
requirements of businesses. Moreover, advice on flood-adapted
building design in flood-prone areas must be provided more
systematically; building constraints or recommendations should
be considered.
Flood risk awareness
Precautionary actions require risk awareness and consequently
risk communication. After the 2002 flood, a lack of continuity in
risk communication between flood events was observed. To
counteract this deficit, a wide information campaign was called
for, which should include the setup of flood marks, compilation
and dissemination of hazard maps, creative educating ideas, as
well as the communication of precautionary and coping strategies
(DKKV 2003).  
In general, all demanded activities of the information campaigns
were implemented comprehensively over the years. An essential
step in consolidating risk communication was made with the
publicly available hazard and risk maps owing to the European
Floods Directive (a German-wide overview of all official flood
hazard and risk maps is provided by the German Federal Institute
of Hydrology (BfG) http://geoportal.bafg.de/mapapps/resources/
apps/HWRMRL-DE/index.html?lang=de) and in the multihazard
web portal “Kompass Naturgefahren” launched by the German
Association of Insurers (GDV) for pilot regions. These maps are,
however, often not sufficiently tailored to the needs and
knowledge of the general public. Moreover, the provided hazard
and risk information is often inadequately linked to precautionary
measures and coping options.  
To further improve flood risk information, the setup of a joint
and nationwide natural hazard portal and related information
campaigns of the federal government, the federal states, and the
insurance industry was recommended by the German Conference
of Environment Ministers in October 2014. Because information
needs, coping capabilities, and adaptation capacities vary within
the general public, certain subgroups, e.g., homeowners, tenants,
or people with special needs, should be identified and addressed
by tailored information and media. Finally, information on flood
hazards, precautionary measures and coping possibilities should
be linked more effectively.
Preparedness for response and recovery
Flood warning
In contrast to many other natural hazards, floods can be
forecasted comparatively well, with the exception of flash floods,
and up to several hours to days in advance. Thus the time up until
the event fully evolves can be used for damage reduction by
emergency measures such as the evacuation of places and
buildings or the management of retention areas, e.g., the release
of water from dams. In Germany, the German Weather Service
(DWD) is responsible for providing warnings on extreme weather
situations, while the federal states are responsible for flood
forecasting, warning, and emergency response.  
In 2002, the compilation and forecasts of the impending (flood)
situations were often undifferentiated and released without an
assessment of the dangers, so that the affected parties were unable
to deduce appropriate and damage-reducing emergency actions
(DKKV 2003). Integrated early warning systems from
monitoring through to the reaction of the affected parties were
insufficiently developed and hardly evaluated. Besides better risk
communication, maintenance and upgrading of models and
systems to the latest technologies as well as more efforts to provide
up-to-date and reliable input data for the forecast models were
hence recommended (DKKV 2003, Thieken et al. 2005a).  
By June 2013, clear progresses in the technical systems and the
organization of warnings were discernible at all levels. The DWD
has improved all numerical forecast models, introduced
uncertainty assessment by ensemble simulations, and
disseminated warnings by various media including web-based
services. The DWD has teamed up with emergency response units
in the districts and (regional) flood forecasting centers that use
precipitation forecasts as one main input for their rainfall-runoff-
models (DKKV 2015). With regard to flood warnings, far-
reaching cross-departmental and transnational collaboration
across the federal states has been achieved. In some federal states,
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e.g., in Lower Saxony, Saxony, and Thuringia, flood forecasting
and warning was reorganized after 2002; dissemination and
communication pathways were clearly defined and feedback
loops were established to avoid interruptions of the alerting
process (DKKV 2015). In addition, an internet portal (http://
www.hochwasserzentralen.de) was established to allow a country-
and basin-wide assessment of the flood situation, which was
impossible in 2002. However, this crisis communication is to some
extent not consistent with risk communication. For instance,
hazard maps are not well linked to warning stages, and the term
“extreme flood” is interpreted differently.  
In 2013, precipitation and runoff forecasts were in general precise
and were issued well in advance (e.g., DWD 2013, DKKV 2015).
In places there were, however, inaccuracies in the rainfall forecasts
that propagated in the runoff forecasts. Occasionally, the all-clear
signal was given too soon or an overload of the IT-systems
occurred, so that the exchange of data and its onward
transmission was compromised. Also the timely and reliable
identification of levee breaches and their effects on the flood
situation downstream as well as on the inundation of the
hinterland was difficult, e.g., in Bavaria and Saxony-Anhalt
(DKKV 2015).  
Because the quality of flood forecasts largely depends on the
quality of rainfall forecasts, the latter should be further improved.
In addition, rainfall-runoff-models should be expanded,
especially with regard to a common appraisal of uncertainties. In
situations where levee breaches might occur, new procedures for
rapid hydraulic modeling or appraisal of the inundation would
be particularly valuable; approaches to identify potential breach
locations and their sizes should be further investigated. Finally,
continuity, redundancy, and capacity of the technical systems and
staff  must be guaranteed. In this process, the training of staff
deserves special attention.
Emergency response
Because integrated early warning systems were insufficiently
developed by 2002, warnings hardly contained any information
on what affected parties should do to protect themselves and to
mitigate flood damage (Thieken et al. 2007). Therefore, DKKV
(2003) recommended significantly improving the activity
orientation of warnings. Residents, businesses as well as
authorities were hardly prepared for the 2002 event (Kreibich and
Thieken 2009). For instance, only 10% of affected companies had
emergency plans available, and only 4% had undertaken flood
emergency exercises before August 2002 (Kreibich et al. 2007).  
Solidarity with affected parties was high during the event;
basically all helped each other. However, integration of volunteers
in emergency management was challenging in terms of logistics
and liability issues. To strengthen individual, commercial, and
public emergency management capacities, strategic thinking and
practical exercises need to be undertaken early and continuously
(DKKV 2003).  
In contrast to 2002, residents, businesses, and authorities were
significantly better prepared in 2013, probably due to intense
flood experience as well as improved risk and emergency
communication (Kreibich et al. 2011a). For instance, in 2002 only
14% of private households clearly knew how to protect themselves
and their assets, in 2013 this fraction was 46 % (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. Answers of flood-affected residents to the question
whether they knew how to protect themselves and their assets
from the flood.
During the 2013 flood, emergency management and disaster
control as well as affected people and companies reacted to the
warnings significantly more effectively than in 2002 (DKKV
2015). Collaboration within and among different disaster
response organizations has clearly gained in effectiveness because
of the coordination by the joint reporting and situation center
(GMLZ) and transnational exercises, e.g., the biennial
transnational crisis management exercise LÜKEX, but it is still
complicated by state-specific provisions (DKKV 2015). Again,
many volunteers wanted to support the emergency management
during the flood in 2013. In contrast to 2002, they organized
themselves via social media in many places and partly acted
parallel to or independently from established disaster response
organizations. The phenomenon of the “independent helpers”
reached a new dimension in self-organization and created a
momentum of support.  
Comprehensive communication along the warning chain has been
largely achieved, but should be evaluated, exercised, and further
improved continually. An honest communication that presents
and prepares for possible protection failures would be beneficial
for all stakeholders. Protection failures, such as levee breaches,
should be integrated into crisis management exercises, e.g.,
LÜKEX. Interorganizational exercises strongly support a high
performance capacity of emergency response. To integrate
“independent helpers” into disaster response more effectively, new
approaches must be developed. Platforms based on the example
of Team Austria (http://apps.teamoesterreich.at) are highly
promising.
Risk transfer and recovery
If  flood damage cannot be avoided, risk transfer mechanism help
to distribute the financial burden within the society based on the
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principle of mutual solidarity. In Germany, flood insurance is in
principle available for private households and commercial or
industrial enterprises. It is usually offered as a selectable add-on
to property insurance or if  it is already included, it can be opted
out. Furthermore, there are insurance products that cover
business interruption losses caused by flooding. Insurance
penetration has been inching up over the last years, i.e., flood
insurance of buildings rose from 19% in 2002 to 34% in 2013
(GDV 2014), reached 38% in 2015 (GDV 2015), but is still
comparatively low. Therefore, governmental aid is occasionally
provided. After the flood in 2002, €7.1 billion was made available
from the Federal Government for reconstruction of affected
infrastructure as well as for restoring flood-affected private
households and companies. But the allocation of the funds was
not linked to precautionary measures (DKKV 2003). Therefore,
the opportunity to correct past organizational, building and
planning errors during the reconstruction was largely
underexploited after the 2002 event.  
Also during the 2013 event, great solidarity was discernible. Once
again €8 billion was made available for reconstruction at short
notice, not only to restore damaged households and companies,
but also to repair damaged infrastructure. In 2013, resource
allocation to affected residents and companies appears to have
been handled more restrictively than after the 2002 flood (DKKV
2015). Regrettably, the opportunity to combine reconstruction
with risk reduction was missed once again. On the contrary,
generous state assistance creates few incentives for future self-
provision, e.g., by contracting flood insurance, even if  the past
shows that state reconstruction aid is usually not provided for
small events. Analyses by Thieken et al. (2006) and DKKV (2015)
reveal that losses of insured households are compensated more
reliably and faster than losses of uninsured.  
Ad-hoc decisions on reconstruction aid should be replaced by a
structured risk transfer system that must take into account the
current form of insurance against damage caused by natural
hazards. For this purpose, a clear legislation for reconstruction
assistance, e.g., in the form of a federal loss compensation
guideline is necessary. Overall, the link between reconstruction
and risk reduction should be strengthened on all levels (federal
government, federal states, municipalities, insurance companies,
companies, and private households).
TOWARD A MORE INTEGRATED FLOOD RISK
MANAGEMENT
To be effective and efficient the different flood risk reduction
measures addressed above have to be combined and well balanced
across sectoral, regional, or national borders. The repeated flood
events over the last 20 years have demonstrated that this is already
challenging in multilevel governance systems. Furthermore, the
debate on climate change and land-use development implies that
flood risks can further change in the future. Successful flood risk
management is hence not a singular action, but requires continual
evaluation and adaptation to changing boundary conditions as
is already foreseen by the regular updates of the tasks in the
European Floods Directive (EC 2007). Therefore, we recommend
reinterpreting the flood risk management cycle in order to
accomplish the following (Fig. 5):  
1. to recognize events systematically as a performance test and
opportunity to remove weak points, 
2. to adapt risk reduction strategies to new boundary
conditions, and 
3. to monitor flood risk and develop well-balanced risk
reduction and coping strategies. 
Fig. 5. Enhanced cycle of flood risk management.
A proposal for an enhanced flood risk management cycle
Flood events serve as an opportunity to investigate risk reduction
measures, their effectiveness, and their interaction in a river basin
to identify and remove weak points. Improvements in flood risk
management since 2002 show that such learning processes take
effect on many levels. Progresses in flood warning, property-level
mitigation (self-provision), and disaster response as well as the
improved efficiency of flood defenses serve as good examples for
this. To fully exploit their learning potential, loss events should be
well documented and analyzed. However, a comparison of
documentations of the 2013 flood published by different water
authorities quickly reveals that the scope and content of such
reports are very diverse; some do not even contain conclusions or
recommendations (DKKV 2015). Thus the development of
standardized interdisciplinary event documentations and data
archives is urgently recommended.  
Any lessons-learned evaluation of damaging events should,
however, go beyond an analysis and removal of weak points.
Damaging events call for a thorough reflection of flood risk
management strategies. Therefore, the traditional cycle of risk
management was augmented by a second loop in Figure 5. At the
junction, scrutiny of existing targets in risk management (e.g.,
safety levels), decision criteria and assessment methods,
responsibilities, as well as the mixture and prioritization of
measures is essential in order to be in a position to undertake
strategic changes. As a rule, the timeliness and completeness of
hazard and risk scenarios used for planning must be reflected, e.
g., the most recent event has to be incorporated in (frequency)
analyses and scenarios. Furthermore, event and risk analyses also
ought to take account of the impact of climate change and societal
changes, e.g., land-use changes, demographic changes, changes in
flood risk management, as well as behavior and capacities of
people at risk, that could impact on the extent of damage. Full
costs should be considered (Kreibich et al. 2014). Because these
appraisals are uncertain, it has also to be discussed how flexible
and robust flood defenses and precautionary measures are or how
they could be designed and equipped to be more flexible. Instead
of ever-increasing design values, the upgradability of flood
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defenses, the development of fail-safe strategies, and the rigorous
consideration of residual risks are essential. Therefore, a
participatory two-way risk dialogue must be established.  
Although everyday politics tend to withstand strategic changes
in favor of incremental changes, (extreme) loss events offer a
window of opportunity for a strategic reorientation as is marked
by the National Flood Protection Program (Fig. 2). However,
high-impact events call for quick political responses. Therefore,
it is recommended to adapt existing concepts and strategies in
flood-free times as laid out in the European Floods Directive: the
preliminary risk assessment, hazard maps and risk maps, and the
management plans must be updated every six years (EC 2007).
This statutory revision should be used to further develop
catchment-wide integrated risk management strategies. For this,
experiences, i.e., both successes and challenges, should be
systematically assessed in planning and implementation, in order
for processes and procedures to be scrutinized and revised where
appropriate.
CONCLUSIONS
The review of flood risk management in Germany after the flood
in June 2013 highlights considerable improvements since 2002 on
many levels, in particular (1) an increased consideration of flood
hazards in spatial planning and urban development, (2)
comprehensive property-level mitigation and preparedness
measures, (3) more effective flood warnings and improved
coordination of disaster response, and (4) a more targeted
maintenance of flood defense systems. In 2013, this led to more
effective flood event management than in 2002 and to a reduction
of damage: although the flood of 2013 is regarded in hydrological
terms as the most severe flood event in the last decades, the total
damage is by far lower than it was in 2002. Nevertheless, four
important aspects remain unclear and need to be further
investigated and clarified.  
1. Balanced and coordinated strategies for reducing and
coping with the impacts of flooding: technical flood
protection always plays a big role in reducing the impacts of
flooding. However, extreme events reveal its limitations. To
remain capable of responding in cases where protective
structures fail, other management approaches, such as
retention, property-level measures, warning, and disaster
response, have to be further improved. Furthermore, the
effectiveness of protective structures has to be checked at
regular intervals and secured through maintenance and
repair, also in the forelands of embankments. To achieve a
sustainable reduction of damage, preventive measures must
be more consistently implemented, also in areas behind
embankments. Replacement or securing of oil tanks
represents an important contribution here, to minimize
damage to property and the environment. Planning mistakes
have to be corrected. With regard to this, among other things
the role and feasibility of resettlements (retreat) has to be
clarified. 
2. Transboundary and cross-sectoral cooperation: because
flooding does not stop at national borders and its impact is
not confined to specific sectors, risk reduction and disaster
response have to be coordinated among various stakeholders
and administrative units. Where cooperation is necessary,
the issues have to be systematically identified and clearly
anchored in flood risk management plans. This particularly
applies to methods for assessing risk and prioritizing
measures within the river basins. 
3. The role of the general public: on the one hand potentially
affected persons are obliged to inform themselves and to
implement mitigation measures at property levels; on the
other hand they are often involved too late in planning
processes, e.g., for flood protection. This inconsistency is to
be resolved by a risk dialogue on equal footing, to enable
local interests, experiences, and knowledge to be integrated
into locally adapted risk management strategies.
Furthermore, binding regulations are to be established for
incorporating the results of such a dialogue in the planning
process. To enhance coping capacities, concepts for
involving volunteers during events have to be developed. 
4. Transparent risk transfer system: the current coexistence of
natural hazards insurance and ad-hoc decisions on
governmental reconstruction aid provides little incentive for
self-provision in Germany, even if  governmental aid is not
granted for smaller events and insured households are more
reliably and quickly compensated than uninsured.
Therefore, ad-hoc decisions on reconstruction aid are to be
replaced by a transparent, nationally consistent risk transfer
system, which takes into consideration the current form of
insurance and enables the improvement of the resilience level
of a damaged structure during reconstruction to build back
better. 
In summary, the LAWA guidelines of 1995 marked a new way of
thinking toward integrated flood risk management in Germany.
However, these have subsequently not been rigorously translated
into action. The August 2002 flood induced legislative changes,
for example, the European Floods Directive and amendments of
the Federal Water Act, by which flood risk management, and
particularly loss prevention, were strengthened. Nevertheless,
actual enforcement is still strongly characterized by planning and
implementing structural flood defenses. After the flood in June
2013, bigger strategic changes are discernible. The systematic
search and creation of retention space seen in the National Flood
Protection Program is one example of a further rejection of a
purely protective concept, even if  this is not always reflected in
the terminology. As a result of the 2013 event and with the current
legislation, there is a chance that a more integrated flood risk
management will become permanently implemented.
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